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THE MAGAZINE. With this number the Magazine resumes the
old name, The American Law Register, by which it was known
for so many years. The prospects for the coming year are very
bright. For a full statement of contributors, see our announcement
in the advertising pages.
SHIPPING; DAMAGE TO CARGO OF SUGAR IN TRANSIT; MEASURE
OF DAMAGE; AUcTION SALE ; The Fi-an/lin Sntgr Refinin, Co. v.
SteamshiP "-Earnwood;" United States District Court, Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, July 2, 1897 (not yet reported) ; J. Rod-
man Paul, Esq., for Libellant: Henry R. Edmunds, Esq., for Res-
pondent. A cargo of dry sugar in transit from the West Indies to
Philadelphia was -somewhat damaged by moisture, which was held
by the court to be due to insufficient dunnage, for which the steam-
ship was responsible. The damaged cargo was sold by the con-
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signees at public sale after due advertisement and notice to the
trade, some three weeks subsequent to the arrival of the cargo, and
was bought in by the consignees themselves. During the interval
between the date of arrival and the date of public sale, the price of
sound sugar had fallen from three and three-sixteenths cents per
pound to two and seven-eighths cents per pound, and the damaged
sugar brought on that day two and one-half cents per pound.
Butler. J., held that the proper method of liquidating the damage
was by a fair auction sale of the damaged cargo, and that libellant's
measure of damage was the difference between the sound value of
the sugar on the date of arrival and the proceeds of sale of the
damaged sugar with allowance for wharfage charges and autioneer's
expenses; and, further, that the additional loss caused by the
decline in the price of sugar between the time of arrival and the
time of sale, must be borne by the vessel. The learned judge said:
"The point made that account should be taken of the change in
market value of sound sugar between the date of arrival and of the
subsequent sale, in ascertaining loss, is interesting, and, if new,
would present difficulty. It has, however, been involved in
numerous cases, arid in no instance has it beep decided as the
respondent contends iL shoald, nor does any elelientary authority
so qualify the general rule governing the subject." Libellant's
brief was annexed ly tne learned judge lo his opinion.
This case decides a point in the z-x ,f :h,. measure of damages
in relation to goods injured in transit that has seldom been dis-
cussed. It is quite true, as noticed by the learned judge in his
opinion, that it must have been involved in numerous cases, and
passed over in silence. The rule of the measure of damages in
these cases has been constantly reiterated, viz., that it is the differ-
ence between the value of the sound and damaged goods at the
time and place of arrival : Hale on Damages, p. 254; Sutherland
on Damages, § 933; Sedgwick on Damages (1891), § 845, et seq;Ye "a/re 3 Fed. 463 (1883) ; Ilfanifacturinjg Co. v. The
"Guidhlg Star," 37 Fed. 641 (1889). But it has never been clearly
pointed out how the value of the damaged goods, as and of that
time and place, shall be determined. If by the opinion of experts
or inspectors after examination of the goods, an element of great
uncertainty is introduced, while great injustice may be done the
carrier, by reason of the irresponsibility of expert opinion ; if, on
the other hand, a public auction sale is the proper way to determine
the value of the damaged article, a sufficient time must intervene
between the date of arrival and the date of sale to give due adver-
tisement and notice to buyers, and in this interval a serious difference
in the value of the damaged article may be shown to have occurred,
and the value at the date of sale may not be the value at the date
of arrival as required by the rule.
In considering the former method, it must be remembered
that there are always to be found those who would not wish
the damaged article at any price. As Judge Morris said, in
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the case of Hamilton v. Bark "Kate h7'ving" 5 Fed. 630
(i88i), "It may be that damaged goods of the particular
kind are not often dealt in. It is often difficult to find mer-
chants who will buy unmerchantable goods at any price, although
to the consumer they may be as serviceable as before tley were
damaged. In this case, one of the principal iron merchants,
called as a witness, said he would not have taken the damaged
cotton ties at any price." And yet, on a sale, these ties brought
not far below their sound value. But the uncertainty of expert
testimony is sufficiently well known, and it is unfair that either
party should be subjected to it, especially the innocent receiver of
the goods, who should be left in no doubt as to his proper course,
in order to liquidate or determine the exact amount of damage.
The only other and the universally preferred method of ascer-
taining the value of damaged articles, is a public sale after due
advertisement and opportunity for bidders to be present: Green-
,ooid v. Cooper, io La. Ann. 796 (1855) ; Hen.erson v. "A/raid
qf Orleans," 12 La. Ann. 352 (1857). In the case of the ship
"Thirlmere," No. 35 of 1894, in this District, unreported, the
precise point was fully discussed by the learned Commissioner, Mr.
Morton P. Henry, and his report was confirmed by the.court.
There a cargo of chalk arrived somewhat damaged by manganese
dust. The consignee refused to accept it, although it had been
delivered at his yard, and merely notified the shipowner that it was
held subject to his order and requesting him to remove it. On the
as.sessment of damages before the commissioner, the chalk was still
in the possession of the libellant, and he attempted to prove the
extent of the damage by the opinions of various experts who had
examined the chalk. The commissioner ruled that a sale was the
only proper and satisfactory way of ascertaining the character and
extent of the damage. The commissioner further held that a
month was a reasonable time within which the sale should have
taken place, and allowance was made for storage, expenses, etc.,
only up to the period of one month after the arrival of the damaged
chalk.
The sale must be deliberate, with a careful regard for the rights
of all concerned. This requires time, and the time in the present
case was not excessive. See The "ifarinin S.," 28 Fed. 664
(1886). The authorities sustain the position that intermediate
fluctuation of the market for sound goods between arrival and sale
oi damaged goods should not be regarded in determining the value
of the latter, as of the prior date of arrival. In Coliard v. The
Southeastern Railwa ' Co., 7 Hurlstone & Norman, 77 (i86i), the
carrier was held liable for damage to certain hops, consigned to a
purchaser and rejected by him. The shipper, to whom they were
returned, dried the same hops which were rendered as good as ever
for actual use, but their market value was depreciated. A sale of
the hops was then had, but at that time the market price of hops
had considerably fallen from what it was at the time when they
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should have been delivered to the consignee. It was held by the
Court of Exchequer that the plaintiff "was entitled to recover as
damages the difference between the market price on the day when
the hops were sold and the day when they ought to have been
delivered." It will be observed that, in deciding this case, the
court did not consider how far more speedy action on the part of
the plaintiff might have brought the damaged hops into the market
when higher prices were ruling for sound hops; the sale was merely
the reasonable method of liquidating and ascertaining the real value
of the damaged hops irrespective of intermediate changes of the
market. In 3Auo--isa; v. .Forio S. S. CO., 36 Fed. 569 (x888),
a cargo of prunes, which should have been delivered not later than
April 28th, was, by the negligence of respondent, not delivered
until June iith, and then in a damaged condition. They were
sold on July 8th, on which day the market price for sound prunes
was six cents per pound, but on account of their damaged condi-
tion a portion of the prunes brought only five and one-half cents.
The market price on April 28th, when they should have been
delivered, was five cents. As the sale, in this case, of the damaged
prunes took place nearly a month after arrival, and the price of
of prunes had considerably advanced, it might have been assumed
that the price of the damaged prunes would have been less on the
day of arrival than on the day of sale, supposing the ratio of
values between sound and damaged fruit to be always the same.
But the court took the actual proceeds of sale as the only test, and
awarded the libellant " the difference between the market price of
sound prunes on June ilth, the day of delayed delivery (five and
three-quarters cents) and the price 1or which the damaged prunes
sold on July 8th (five and one-quarter cents)" : see p. 571. On the
question of the time elapsing belore the sale, Judge Wales said:
"Nor have the respondents any just cause to complain of the post-
ponement of the sale of the damaged prunes. . . . It is ques-
tionable whether the libellant would have been justified in making
an immediate sale and without an endeavor to secure the highest
attainable price: " Citing 7he ".li-ini,, S.," supra. In this
case neither the ibellant on the one hand, nor the respondent on
the other, was allowed to profit by the incidental rise in prices.
The libellant was not permitted to compute the value of the
damaged prunes as of the clay of arrival by relation to the lower
value of sound prunes on that day ; nor was the respondent per-
mitted to urge the increased market value of so'nd prunes as a
recoupment to the hbellant for his loss. The principal case is the
exact converse of this. The " Earnwood" should no more profit
hY the accidental fall in the price of sound sugar than the libellant
was permitted to profit by the accidental rise in prices in the prune
case. Any other rule is based upon the assumption that there is a
constant ratio between the values of sound and damaged articles
having a market rating. This is a fallacy : peculiar circumstances,
quite outside of those influencing the general market, affect the
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prices of damaged goods. It would be injurious to the commercial
community if the receiver of cargo, damaged in transit, must either
sell instantly without proper care or deliberation, or must take the
risk of fluctuations in the market if he waits a reasonable time ; it
would be equally unfortunate to assume as a measure of damage a
supposed constant ratio between the market value of a sound article
and the auction value of a damaged one. J R. . .
TURNPIKE COMPANIE. : EMINENT DOMAIN. The Pennsylvania
Superior Court has recently decided, In re Petition of Inliana ant
Westmore/and YTuriyi/e Co. (not yet reported), that turnpike com-
panies in Pennsylvania have the right of eminent domain. The
doubt upon this subject seems to have arisen from the omission of
the word "over" in theAct of 29 th April, 1874, P. L. 73, Sec. 30,
giving the company the right "to enter in and upon the lands con-
'iktrous anl neay" to which the said road shall be made or con-
structed."
It was argued by the appellant that the Act of 26th Jan., 1849,
P. L. io, gave the right of eminent domain to turnpike companies
in its sixth section, bit that the Act of 29 th April, 1874, having
repealed the former act, and not having re-enacted the pro-
visions of the sixth section, gave no right of eminent domain:
and further, that the intention of the legislature to withhold this
right could be inferred from the fact that section nine of the Act
of 26th Jan., 1849, giving the right to enter in and upon land
contiguous and near to the road, was re-enacted in the Act of 2 9 th
April, 1874.
The court, however, refused to adopt this view and practically
held that the rights given in Act of 1874 included, in fact, the
rights given by sections six and nine of the Act of 1849, which
it repealed, and that it would be an absurdity to give a com-
pany the right to enter.in and upon land contiguous to the road
and withhold the right to enter upon the land over which the road
was to run ; and that the language of the Act necessarily implies,
if it does not literally give, the right to enter upon the land for the
purpose of constructing the road. "Moreover," says the court,
" the Act of 1874 expressly gives all road companies incorporated
in accordance with its provisions the benefits of all the general laws
of the Commonwealth regulating turnpike and plank road com-
panies, and this declaration furnishes very strong evidence of an
intention not to withhold from turnpike companies to be incor-
porated in the future a power conferred by a prior law and one so
essential to the execution of the purpose of their creation."
Though the language of the Act of 1874 is vague enough to give
some grounds for the appellant's contention, the decision of the
court would seem to be in accord with the generally-accepted view
of the law on this subject. In the case of Grof's Appeal, 128 Pa.
621 (1889), reaffirmed on reargument in Groffv. Turnpike Co., 144
Pa. 150 (1896), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decided that
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turnpike companies, incorporated under the Act of 1874, by a charter
which specifies the termini of its roadway, but is silent as to its inter-
mediate route, cannot appropriate an existing public highway merely
to avoid the expense of acquiring a new route through private
property, but it certainly seemed to assume that the company had
the right of eminent domain so far as the right to take private
property was concerned. A strong dissenting opinion was given
in this case by Mr. Chief Justice Paxson, which held that under
some circumstances the turnpike company might even appropriate
the public highway.
In view of the fact that the right could not have been well ques-
tioned until the passage of the Act of 1874, and that the courts
have heretofore assumed and now have flatly decided that that Act
has not changed the law, there seems to be no ground for denying
that the turnpike companies possess and may exercise the right of
eminent domain.
INSOLVENCY; FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES; RIGHTS OF GRANTEE.
The Supreme Court of Oregon, in the case of Sabin v. Anderson,
49 Pac. (Oregon) 870, July 31, 1897, held the grantees, mar
fide, of an insolvent, personally liable to his creditors for the prop-
erty conveyed, viz., several promissory notes, for the proceeds of
which they (the grantees) were to account to the insolvent, deduct-
ing 5 per cent. as compensation for their services.
The material facts of the case were as follows: Anderson, the
insolvent, in fraud of creditors, delivered the notes in controversy
to Lively & Bently, bankers (joined as co-defendants), in return
receiving negotiable cash certificates for $6,479.23. Apprehensive
that these negotiable certificates would find their way into the hands
of a bona filde purchaser, Lively & Bently afterwards purchased
them (through an agent) from the insolvent for $2,8oo. To the
action by the assignee of creditors' claims, two defences were ad-
vanced by the grantees. First, that they had acted bona fi:de;
second, that, in any case, the grantees were entitled to a credit for
the $2,80o expended in recovering the certificates. The first
objection was dismissed by the court. As to the second, it was
answered that, as the money had been paid to protect the defendants
and not to restore the property held by them in fraud of creditors,
they were entitled to no credit therefor: Hoia v. Camp, Walk. Ch.
(Mich.) 427 (1844) ; Sands v. Codioise, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) 596
(1820). The court also held that, as garnishment and attachment
laws do not provide an adequate and complete remedy to uncover
assets fraudulently conveyed and to compel an accounting, the jurisdic-
tion of equity would attach. For the jurisdiction of equity in such
cases, see Picrs/o/f v. jw.;,es, 86 Wis. 128 (1893) ; Gui/ickson el al.
v. Jtzdscn, 87 Wis. 19 (1894) ; F]eldenhemerv. T2-essel, 6 Dakota,
265 (I880. lropt~rty of an equitable character and property con-
veyed in fraud of creditors may be reached by a creditor's bill:
Stadcr v DaVis, 5 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 28o (1821) ; Sader v.
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DaVis, 20 Johns. 554 ; IMebsler v. Folsom. 58 Me. 230 (870) :
airwer- v. _nirav, 6o Me. 227 (1872); Barrv v. Abbot, ioo
Mass. 396 (1868) ' ;Dauipr v. Aleinsmi/h, II Wall. 614 (I 870) ;
See, also, Bispham on Equity, 526, and cases there cited; ,th
v. Doat, 4 McLean, 112 (1846) : Davison v. Burke, 143 Ills.
139 (i892); and see Wait on Fraudulent Conveyances, Third
Edition (i897), , 68 efseq.
MIxix.; : TITLE By ADVERSE Pb.-:,.-SfO.-A.s AFFE'CTE fy CiiAN(,E
Ix PAPER TITLE To COAL. The decision rendered in the case of
Finmtegwt v. S/iintaw',, 5 Pa. Super. Ct. 124 (Ma' 3. 1897), de-
cides a point never before raised in Pennsylvania, i. e., whether
the mere recording of a conveyance of coal stops the running of the
statute of limitations in favor of one in the actual, adverse and
exclusive possession of the land under color of title, at the time the
conveyance was made.
The case in question was an action of trespass to recover the
value of coal mined and removed from under certain land in Cambria
county. The plaintiff claimed title by adverse possession for the
period of twenty-one years and over immediately prior to the
alleged trespass in 1895. The defendants rested their claim on an
agreement dated the seventh of January, 1874, given by the then
owners of the paper title to the land in dispute. This agreement
was an ordinary lease, and the defendants claimed that it was a sale
of the coal under the land, that it operated as a severance thereof
from the surface, and having been recorded, the purchaser thereby
entered into possession, and his possession afterwards was not
affected by the ownership of the title to or the possession of the
surface.
A long list of Pennsylvania cases support the claim that this lease
amounted to a sale of the coal in place : Sadei'son v. Sawuto,
lo5 Pa. 469 (1884) : ]onlolt v. Gamble, 123 Pa. 240 (888) :
Lclq*h Goal Go. v. ll-i'ml', 177 Pa. 387 (1896) ; Htypes' Appeal,
29 W. N. C. 365 (891).
On the other hand, the cases show that where there has been a
severence of the po.,session of the surface and the right to the
minerals beneath it. that the owner of the surface can claim no title
to the mineral by virtue of twenty-one years non-user on the part
of the owner of the lower strata: Galwell v. Cye/lau, 37 Pa. 427
(186o); 4.1md's1ri. v. GadWelIl, 53 Pa. 284 (x866) ";tgsler v.
Iillsi,le C. 2- .Co., 144 Pa. 613 (1891): .41gollvlin Coal Co. v.
Norlher, C. &-' Z. Co., 162 Pa. 114 (1894). In all these cases,
however, the (laim of title by possession of the surface was made
only alter the surface and the lower strata had been severed. The
court distinguished the present case from the above in the following
manner. " Here dissisin of the coal, as well as of the surface, had
actually taken place before their severence in title. One was as
much out of the actual po.session of the owner of the asserted legal
title as the other. At the date of the lease, and for many years
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before, piaintiff was in the actual, open, adverse and exclusive pos-
session of the land under a claim of right. His deed was on record.
and in connection with his possession was notice to the wvorld of
the extent of his claim, which pre.umptively included not merely
the surface but all beneath and above it, in accordance with the
ancient common law maxim." . . . . " Neither he nor his suc-
cessors in title ever did anything which could be construed as
restricting their possession to the surface merely. Nor, as we have
seen, did the purchaser of the coal attempt to oust them, unless the
recording of his lease was an ouster-a proposition that we cannot
agree to.,.
The court, therefore, decided that as between the le.see and a
third party, who is in the actual, open. adverse, exclusive and
peaceable possession of the land, the recording of the instrument is
not equivalent to an entry, and, there being no other interruption
of his possession, when the full period of twenty-one years from its
inception has elapsed,-his title to the land becomes perfect.
CRIMINAL LAW : HOMICIDE : l)RUNKENNE:-. In !P/siloa v.
State, 37 Atl. 954 (.N. J. Errors and Appeals, June 28, 1897 ), it
was held that the extent of intoxication necessary to lower the
grade of the crime to second-degree murder must be such that the
prisoner's faculties were prostrated, and that he was rendered in-
capable of forming a specific intent to take life. From this decision
there was a strong dissent, in which six of the judges concurred.
The dissenting opinion was filed September 20. 1897, and is
reported in 38 Atl. 428. The grounds for the dissent were that,
upon the question of degree, the issue was whether, as matter of
fact, the defendant had formed a specific intent to take life, and not
whether he had proved that he could not have formed it.
The reasoning of the minority of the court seems to be correct
and unanswerable. The question was directly decided in Ten-
nessee, in the case of Haile v. S/ate. ii I-umph. 154 (185o in
which the Supreme Court of that state took the same view as the
minority of the court in the principal case. The same view has
been taken in other jurisdictions: Fere-l v. S/ale. 43 Tex. 503
(1875) : Teri/oyn v. Fratnklin, 2? New Mex. 307 (1882 : Sah
v. J 1wr., 15 Pac. 286 (Kan., 1887).
But drunkenness as a defence has always been regarded with dis-
favor by the law, and in order that it may mitigate the offence
charged, it is only allowable in those cases where a specific mental
condition is required to constitute the crime. Voluntary drunken-
ness never excuses a crime : and, by the weight of authority, it only
lessens the degree when it exists to such an extent that the person
committing the crime is incapable of forming the design. If he is
,apable, the intent will be presumed: People v. Rogers, 18 N. Y.
9 (1858) : Golliher v. Commonweallh, 2 Duval (Ky.), 163
(1865) : Rober-ts v. Petple, 19 'Mich. 401 (1870): People v.
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Odtell, i Dak. 197 (1875). And see 4 American and English
Encyc. of Law, 707 et seq.
In Pennsylvania it has been held that voluntary drunkenness is
an aggravation of crime; and short of destruction of reason it is
not a defence: 6ommonwealth v. Ha-nr, 2 Brewster (Pa.), 546
(1868).
DIVORCE; PREGNANCY. Concealment at marriage. (See vol.
36 N. S., No. 12, Dec., 1897, page 779.)
The question whether a marriage is rendered voidable by the
pregnancy of the wife at the time of it by a man other than her
husband, received able treatment at the hands of jeune, President,
in the recent case of Mfoss v. Mfoss [1897], Probate 263 (May 2oth).
Petitioner and respondent were married on September 29th, and
the latter gave birth to a child October 17th. On the wedding
day he first suspected her condition, and taxed her with it. She
denied the charge. The court held that concealment by a woman
from her husband at the time of her marriage of the fact that she
is then pregnant by another man is not sufficient ground to declare
the marriage null and void.
Fraud will vitiate a marriage contract, but only such fraud as
precludes the required voluntary consent of the parties. The
fraud must go to the essence. Mere misrepresentations as to
wealth, position in society, or even as to chastity, are not sufficient
to impeach the bond of matrimony.
In some of the United States, although concealment of loss of
virginity does not, yet concealment of the fact of pregnancy by
another man at the time of marriage, does vitiate the contract.
The three principal cases are Rernola, v. Rejno/lrl, 85 Mass. 6o5
(1862), where it was held that concealed pregnancy is a ground
for nullity of marriage; Donov'an v. Donovaiz, 91 Mass. 140
(i864), where, under such circumstances, evidence of an express
representation of chastity by the wife before marriage was deemed
unnecessary: and A/len's Appeal, 99 Pa. 196 (i88i), where
such concealment was held to raise a question for the jury, under
the direction of the court, whether the facts afforded a ground
which would entitle the husband to disown the marriage. Further
cases are Fss v. Fss, 94 Mass. 26 (i866), and Cirehore v. Cre-
hore, 97 Mass. 330 (1867).
The learned President, Sir F. H. jeune, fails to agree with these
cases, because he believes there is no sound distinction between
concealment of loss of virginity and concealment of pregnancy.
His decision is in accord with the North Carolina case of Scrag-
Wils v. Scrlg gils, 3 Dev. 535 (183), where, although a mulatto
child was born to white parents, the woman having concealed from
the man the fact of having received a negro's embraces about the
time she received his, the marriage was adjudged valid. He quotes
Bishop on MNarriage, Ed. 1891, § 494, as agreeing with the conclu-
sion in Rermhls v. Rteno/,/,, sui-z, but finds the reasoning imade-
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quate. His conclusion, then, is that the American cases rest on an
unsound distinction, and that they should have no weight to alter
the English rule, which is founded on the Canon Law.
INSURANCE; DUAL RELATION OF AGENT TO COMPANY; PAYMENT
OF PREMIUM; ESTOPPEL. The peculiar relation that an insurance
agent bears to his principal is illustrated by the case of L. &- L.
Life Assuran'e Co. v. Fleming [1897], A. C. 499. The Ontario
agent of a London Insurance company made out a policy contain-
ing the following stipulations: (i) "That this shall not be in
force until the first premium is paid ; " (2) "If a note or other
obligation is taken in payment for the premium or any part thereof,
and such note or obligation be not paid when due, the policy of
assurance becomes null and void at and from default." The
insured gave his note, which was never honored, to the Canadian
agent in payment of the first premium, and the assurance company
received the agent's note in discharge of an account which in-
cluded the amount of the premium. In an action on the policy a
strenuous effort was made by the plaintiff to show that the company
was estopped from setting up the defence of non-payment of the
premium, since by their acts they had treated their agent as the
agent of the insured and had received the amount of the premium
from him. This view of the case was taken by the trial judge in
Ontario, and the judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeal,
the justices being equally divided. The Privy Council, however,
reversed the judgment on the ground that "the dealings between
the appellants (assurance company) and their agent were, as regards
the assured, res inter alios, and afford no presumption of an inten-
tion of treating the agent as acting, not for his true principals, but
as the representative of the assured: " Acer v. Fernie, 7 M. & W.
151 (1840) was approved, which rules that even if the insurance
company has debited its agent with the amount of the premium,
yet it is still at liberty to show as a defence that the agent did not
receive the premium until the time for its payment, according to
the terms of the policy, had expired.
American courts seem rather inclined to hold the company bound
by its acts when it has debited the agent with the amount of the
premium. The general rule has been stated, "Delivery of the
policy to the agent authorized to deliver it to to the insured and
receive the premium, in his delivery of the policy to the insured
and acceptance of a note for the premium, and procuring a dis-
count of the same for his own account without paying the premium-
to the principal, constitutes a valid insurance, in spite of a provision
in the policy that such agent shall be deemed the agent of the
insured, and that the insurer shall not be liable until he actually
receives the premium." See Carson v. Jersey Gi , Ins. Co., 43
N. J. I. 300 (188i) ; Con. Ins. C,. v. Ives, 56 Ill. 402 (1870 ) ;
Union I's. Co. v. ChPp5, 93 Ill. 96 (1879) ; Brbellv. Ant. Ins. Co.,
